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CONCEPTUALIZING THE URBAN COMMONS:
THE PLACE OF BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS IN CITY GOVERNANCE1
Dr. Alexandra Flynn, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are self-taxed organizations that are comprised of
businesses and property owners, are approved by city governments, and spend funds to improve
profitability within certain neighbourhood boundaries. BID governance structures can also
include neighbourhood residents and city councillors as voting or non-voting members.
Numerous scholars have written about the role of BIDs in city governance, including the extent
to which they improve or undermine inclusivity and accountability. This paper focuses on a
related question that has not yet been deeply analysed in legal scholarship: can BIDs be
considered a form of urban commons? The term ‘urban commons’ is contested, but generally
refers to the application of the property law notion of the commons to the shared management of
bounded city spaces. This paper extends from existing debates on the meaning of the “urban
commons” and its application to BIDs. This paper uses BIDs in Toronto to introduce decisionmaking, representation, and accountability as elements of just urban governance can serve as the
basis of an evaluation of the urban commons.

Introduction
The word ‘city’ comes from the Latin cīvitās, meaning a highly organized community –
something that has existed almost as long as human history.2 In the context of Ontario, Canada,
the word ‘city’ is undefined in statutory terms: the most recent set of municipal statutes removed
references to titles like ‘city,’ ‘town,’ and ‘village.’3 Generally, cities are nested within the
jurisdiction of provincial, state, or federal governments that limit their authority, and are also
understood as democratic governments that represent their residents.4 In addition to city councils
that serve as the legislatures of decision-making, residents and businesses are also represented by
associations that seek a decision-making role in local matters. One example is a Business
1
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Improvement District (BID). In most cities, these are formed through a city bylaw that levies a
tax on local businesses and property owners, which can amount to millions of dollars per year.
BIDs can have a strong voice in local matters. As BIDs represent private interests, their role
within city governance is uncertain. There is wide debate in the academic literature as to whether
they are lobbyists for businesses, enablers of local action, or a part of a broader local governance
network. Depending on which of these roles they serve, the existence and oversight of BIDs raise
important questions about whose interests are given priority in city governance.
The term ‘urban commons’ has no uniform definition or agreed upon principles, and is used in a
wide range of disciplines.5 The city is an especially interesting setting for commons debates, as it
is “not a frictionless agglomeration of commoners, but rather a site for ongoing contestation
about what counts as a common and who counts as commoners.”6 Its theoretical meaning
emerged from a form of property interest called ‘common property,’ whereby land or resources
are owned, and therefore managed, together with others, rather than having a single owner.
Emerging scholarship is examining the use of the ‘urban commons’ as a theoretical tool to
advance the notion of the ‘just city.’ Most of this scholarship is grounded within the social
sciences, often connecting the urban commons to movements for greater public involvement in
decision-making, whereas in law, the commons is often explored as a kind of property interest.
The urban commons advances that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned,
the city is a territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is
reinforced in law.7 At the same time, scholars have observed that creating neighbourhood
boundaries and enabling localized power can also lead to “insiders” and “outsider” and
disproportionately impacts racialized, low-income people.8 In recent scholarship, notions of the
commons have been applied to discussions of the environment, communications, the rights of the
homeless, among others.9 The conversation about the urban commons is central to situations
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where multiple bodies claim to have rights to govern within an urban context, how such claims
are mediated, and by whom.10
BIDs are meant to represent the interests of local businesses and property owners, and have been
critiqued as exacerbating space-based tensions, in particular in relation to historically
disadvantaged residents. 11 This article brings together these two rich scholarly conversations by
examining the role that BIDs play in city governance and their relationship to the urban
commons. Scholars from many disciplines have analysed BIDs in relation to governance and
geography, often struggling with the self-interested and privileged focus of BIDs within the
larger democratic agendas of city governments. Although they have not explored the relationship
between BIDs and the urban commons, Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione drew upon Elinor
Ostrom’s famous work Governing the Commons to note in passing how BIDs incorporate the
design principles of the commons and inspire other creative conceptualizations of a commons
framework in the urban context, leading to the promise of a more collaborative urban governance
environment.12 Without delving deeply into the conceptualizing of BIDs alongside the urban
commons, other scholars, including Elizabeth Blackmar and Sarah Hamill, have challenged the
application of the idea of the commons to characterize all or part of city space.13
This paper explores the tensions between conceptualizing BIDs as a tool for collaborative justice
or, alternatively, as an exclusive interest group that is privileged within urban governance. The
aim is not to set out a grand, generalized theory of BIDs and their place within the governance of
cities, but rather to understand whether and how BIDs can be considered an example of the urban
commons. It begins by summarizing the existing literature on the scope and meaning of the
‘urban commons,’ including as a form of property interest and a political movement. What do we
mean by the governance of the ‘urban commons,’ and how do BIDs fit into this scheme? Next, it
10
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uses examples from the city of Toronto, the first municipality to introduce BIDs as a form of
local representation, to explore the existing legal framework of BIDs. Can they can be
considered a form of urban commons? Specifically, it explores how an analysis that focuses on
decision-making, representation, and accountability as elements of just urban governance can
serve as the basis of an evaluation of the urban commons This paper also applies normative
characteristics to evaluate claims about the commons. Can the language of the ‘urban commons’
be used to understand BIDs, or does Foster and Iaione’s call for “visible, equal, contestable, and
legitimate” decision-making render this characterization theoretically problematic? How is the
language of the urban commons used in overlapping claims in city governance? By exploring
these issues, this paper helps clarify how dominant groups leverage and rely on state power to
further their economic interests.
Conceptualizing the Urban Commons
Scholars have explored the meaning of the commons and its implications to urban centres in
various ways, but generally all refer to Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom, the grandparents of
contemporary notions of the commons. Hardin, a biologist, claimed that the commons is an
unsatisfactory form of property interest: individual parties do not have a vested interest to
conserve or sustainably use the resource, which inevitably leads to depletion and destruction.14
Hardin ominously called this the ‘tragedy of the commons.’15 Free-riders will take advantage of
the public nature of the good or land: because there are no consequences to this abuse, the
common property will ultimately fall into disrepair. Elinor Ostrom later critiqued his claims on,
among other reasons, the basis of governance.16 She asserted that a commons is not solely a
single resource, as Hardin saw it. She argued that it is a resource plus the social community and
its corresponding values, rules, and norms that are used to manage or govern the resource. In her
book, Governing the Commons, for which she won the Nobel Prize in 1999, Ostrom offered realworld examples of the management of common goods such as fisheries, land irrigation systems,
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and farmlands.17 She argued that the tragedy of the commons could be solved, and identified a
number of factors conducive to successful resource management: first, the resource should have
definable boundaries; second, there must be a perceptible threat of resource depletion and it must
be difficult to find substitutes; third, the presence of small and stable populations with a strong
social network and social norms promoting conservation; and fourth, appropriate communitybased rules and procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments
for overuse.18 These factors were later used in evaluating the commons as applied to cities.19
The commons and the city
A discussion of an urban commons first requires situating the city. Saskia Sassen described the
large, complex city as “a new frontier zone.”20 She wrote, “Access to the city is no longer simply
a matter of having or not having power. Urban spaces have become hybrid bases from which to
act” through robust governance structures.21 Legal authority and governance structures are
critical to action.22 As Canadian legal scholar Hoi Kong wrote, “Cities can be many things, but
they are necessarily creations of the law.”23 Law is key to governance, in that it shapes the
microspaces and bodies within the complex city that play a role in local and city-wide decisionmaking.24 The law serves a critical role in empowering people and communities within an urban
space to engage and act.
The language of the urban commons invokes property law.25 Many property scholars would
agree that formal law (meaning that expressed in codes and on paper) is inadequate in capturing
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how communities form rights and interests in connection to land.26 Law school students are
taught that property’s lineage, back to the origins of English common law, provides a stabilizing
model upon which much of the legal system can be understood. Property courses typically begin
by categorizing the world into four (sometimes overlapping) categories that more or less explain
how title to land and goods can be understood: private, common, public, and non-property or
open access.27 In this model, private property is owned by individuals who can exclude others
from access. Common property is collectively owned, while public property is managed and
controlled by government. The final category has no ownership and can be freely used by all.
Hamill argued that these categories are “hopelessly inadequate for the real world.”28 Many other
scholars have recently criticized what they consider an overly simplistic, strictly doctrinal
understanding of property, which oversimplifies the idea of ‘owner’ and the many parties with
legal and other interests in property,29 the link between belonging and property,30 whether
property includes obligations to third-party non-interest holders,31 the transformative effects of
environmental and indigenous law on property,32 who sets the agenda for private property,33 and
the many communities who live on and put land to work without any desire to formalize their
rights.34
Common property presents a particular problem for traditional interpretations of property law.35
Common property interests are shared among many users, without necessarily having divided
lines, hierarchical interests, or the capacity to exclude, each of which feature in traditional
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conceptions of private property.36 But these divisions are neither neat, nor generalizable. Carol
Rose, for example, disputed the characterization of common property as an inevitable tragedy,
arguing instead that public property, which is both owned and managed by society at large, is
better understood as a “comedy.”37 Law controls access of certain lands to the public, because
“public access to those locations is as important as the general privatization of property in other
spheres of our law.”38 In her comprehensive account, common property is crucial to protecting
the interests of private property holders; it is not a separate binary.
According to Foster and Iaione’s urban commons framework, regardless of whether spaces are
privately or publicly owned, the city is a territorial space in which citizens have a role or stake, a
norm which is reinforced in law.39 They built on Ostrom’s argument, which challenged the
assumption that common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and
inefficiency to the urban form. In the context of the city, common pool resources are particular
urban spaces, which then become sites of governance. Public–private organizations can work
together to effectively play a role in governing specific city areas, but to do so they must
incorporate ‘bottom-up’ governance. The city as commons is thus a system of governance over
particular city spaces, which incorporates subsidiarity, or delegated authority, and polycentrism,
meaning multiple parties are working together.
Three key debates have emerged in conceptualizing the ‘urban commons.’ First, scholars have
conceptualized the city as a whole an example of the commons, as well as micro-spaces within
the urban commons, e.g., public streets, public parks, any public and neighbourhood amenities,
and public spaces.40 Nicholas Blomley argued that an ‘urban commons’ includes community
gardens, land trusts and squatting; he provided an example of a large private property
development in downtown Vancouver that resulted in the eviction of a sizeable homeless
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population. 41 He recommended that the idea of the commons be reframed as a model that is not
as “radically dissimilar from private property as one might suppose,”42 especially as the
commons was historically considered exclusive under English law.43 He argued that property had
political weight, providing individuals and groups in the city with a language for “naming,
blaming and claiming.”44 From this perspective, it is possible to apply the idea of the urban
commons – the weight of private property as crafted by city governments through the vehicle of
law – to equally argue that non-property owners have a right to a parcel of land.45 Blomley
wrote, “Not only does the making of property entail the making of space … but property’s
enactments are also caught up in the creation of particular landscapes that are simultaneously
material and representational.”46
Second, scholars have debated whether the actual ownership of a resource, public or private, is
relevant in the context of the urban commons or whether the focus should instead be placed on
governance.47 Institutions are meant to protect and enhance shared resources in a city,48 and land
use regulations are seen as a way to improve utility or value within an urban landscape. To some
scholars, the city government is the appropriate decision-maker.49 Foster and Iaione argued that
if local government does not manage the urban commons appropriately for whatever reason,
“regulatory slippage” can occur, whereby the common resource is degraded in value or
attractiveness for other types of users and uses.50 They continued that at this point, the space in
question “creates conditions which begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin
wrote about—that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and perhaps
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destruction.”51 The openness of many cityscapes yields social benefits but quickly mimics the
conditions of a common pool resource of overuse in either volume or intensity. Put simply, the
‘common pool resource’ of the city may be owned by a variety of actors, with the governance of
these actors as the more relevant discourse in a commons analysis.52
A third debate centres on how the interests of third parties are mediated.53 There are more than
two possible choices in maintaining the urban commons, not just government centralized
regulation or privatization. There are alternative avenues for decision-making and management
of the urban commons, such as those used for cooperative natural resource management
regimes.54 From this perspective, the city government may not act as an appropriate steward of
city space, so some other form of governance can and should be invoked to limit the degradation
of city resources. This is sometimes called ‘bottom up governance’ – making room for copartners, or co-collaborators who use and have a stake in the commons.55 In other words, urban
commons can be conceived as spaces with shared access to local resources for residents with a
common stake in ensuring the longevity of a resource: a commons governance model that
includes non-government actors can protect the ‘common good.’56 For example, non-state actors
can get involved in a governance model when governments are too strained to address a broader
range of city issues.57 Clapp and Meyer use the commons framework to describe the governance
practices of institutional actors with regard to the environment.58 They questioned the ability of
city governments to limit environmental depletion, due to existing municipal institutions of
varying scales, regulatory structures, land markets, and state and local government policies and
regulations. They argued that to ensure distributional equity, municipal institutions should allow
communities to protect themselves from harm through the establishment of shared cooperative
normative structures. In this way, governance beyond the state achieves a degree of fairness that
is otherwise not possible.59
51
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These debates, although important and different from one another, each frame the urban
commons as a model of collaborative governance. Whether the space is part or all of the city,
and regardless of ownership, the government and third parties interact in the management of the
resource. Scholars are torn with regard to the extent to which cooperative management is
facilitated by a strict centralized government action versus privatized actions.60 For example,
Foster argued that the state needs to create “the conditions under which citizens can develop
collaborative relationships with each other” and cooperate together and with public authorities.61
Are BIDs an example of an urban commons?
What is a Business Improvement District?
BIDs are self-taxed organizations that operate at the local level. They complicate notions of the
urban commons. On one hand, they participate in governance in particular areas of the city as
independent third parties. On the other hand, they are part of a city’s local governance
framework and are accountable to the city and the public.62 Despite the emergence of these
organizations internationally, no naming conventions or definitions have been standardized,63 but
BID is one common term.64 A BID generally has three features: first, it provides a specific set of
powers to business and property owners to achieve their mandate, most notably an organizational
structure and direct access to the local councillors who serve on their boards. Second, it is funded
through a required levy against local property owners or businesses, which functions as a form of
taxation. Local businesses cannot back out of paying even if they voted against forming a BID or
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disagree with its activities. Third, it supplements public services offered by the City, which more
broadly defines their entrenched governance role.65
The first BID worldwide was established in Toronto in 1970, and was called a “business
improvement area.” Toronto defines a business improvement areas as an association comprised
of commercial and industrial property owners and business tenants within a specified geographic
area district, which is officially approved by the City to stimulate business and improve
economic vitality.66 In the late 1960s, a small group of business leaders wanted to create a form
of business association that would circumvent the ‘free-rider problem,’ whereby improvements
by a small set of business owners would also advantage those who did not pay or otherwise
contribute. They created an independent, privately managed organization with the power to
impose an additional tax on all commercial property owners in the area to be directed to local
revitalization initiatives, regardless of whether specific businesses individually agreed to form
the BID.67 Local business leaders believed that a stable and effective funding source would help
with beautification and improvement, promote urban business areas, and ultimately allow them
to regain market share.68 This organizational form has not changed substantially in the following
45 years.69 A long, complex process must be followed in order for City Council to pass a bylaw
designating a BID, including a formal public consultation meeting and the polling of BID
members.70
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Map 1: BIDs in Toronto (Original research, 2016).
Despite this cumbersome process, Toronto now has 82 BIDs, 43 of which were created after
2000.71 Many are now located in industrial areas and suburbs outside of the downtown core.72
They vary greatly in their levies, from thousands to millions of dollars.73 They also differ based
on their year of origin and size. BIDs are also distributed unevenly across Toronto, with different
kinds of businesses. Overall, BIDs represent only 36.1% of businesses in the city, as illustrated
in Map 1.74 The largest and wealthiest are located in downtown and central areas. The downtown
and central section of the city, known as the Toronto-East York Community Council area,
comprises less than a quarter of the city’s population, but has 59% of its BIDs. While TorontoEast York continues to have the majority of new BIDs, with 27 having been created since 2000
and five since 2010, its relative share of BIDs has declined since 2010. Map 2 illustrates the
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relationship between BIDs and density, with the oldest of Toronto’s BIDs appearing in denser
neighbourhoods.

Map 2: Map of BIAs and density (Original research, 2016).
Municipal bylaws tell two conflicting stories about the legal status of BIDs. On one hand, they
are defined as ‘local boards’ and are therefore subject to numerous operating requirements that
include open meeting requirements and record keeping. The appointment of their members must
follow the city’s public appointments policy. Directors and board members, including the local
city councillor, must conduct their affairs in compliance with all applicable law and City
policies, which include privacy legislation, conflict of interest requirements, and the public
appointments policy.75 The requirements for creating a BIDs are detailed in the procedural bylaw
and their funding is collected through the city’s formal levying authorities and coordinated
through an office dedicated to supporting their operations. The levy is drawn from local
businesses and then forwarded to the BID when its annual budget is approved by City Council.
All members of the BID are legally obligated to pay the municipality their portion of the levy,

75

City of Toronto, City of Toronto Municipal Code s 19-15(K).

13

which is based on the assessment values of the individual and neighbourhood properties.76 BIDs
are tasked with overseeing the improvement, beautification, and maintenance of municipally
owned land, buildings, and structures in the BID beyond standard City levels.77 The City’s
bureaucratic structure provides professional operational and administrative support to BIDs to
ensure compliance with the Municipal Code and other relevant City policies.78 A BID office,
operated out of the economic development department, also oversees partnership projects with
BIDs, including a capital cost-share program for streetscape improvement projects, street
beautification initiatives, and grants to upgrade the physical appearance of their buildings.79
The second story involves BIDs as independent organizations representing their members within
specific geographic boundaries. Toronto city councillors represent local interests at City Council.
Ward councillors consult and are lobbied by numerous bodies advocating on behalf of residents,
businesses, and other stakeholders, including BIDs, neighbourhood associations, and park
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors have great
discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local development, and
bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and initiate projects. Within this
framework, BIDs – together with organizations like neighbourhood associations – are often
privileged in terms of consultation and involvement in decision-making, especially in higherincome areas, as shown in Map 3. Ward councillors play a key role in the creation of BIDs,
stewarding the passing of bylaws needed for their creation and helping local businesses meet city
requirements.80 Once established, BIDs are important participants in city planning decisions, and
include councillors, staff, and city-paid consultants.81
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Map 3: BIAs, neighbourhood associations, and income levels (Original research, 2016).82
In interviews I conducted for a larger project related to city governance,83 one senior staff
member at the City of Toronto explained that BIDs are “self-funding, defiant entities that operate
in neighbourhoods, they’re actually not really democratic. They’re self-governing within the
boundaries defined.”84 A former city councillor similarly referred to these organizations as “tiny
little cities” within their areas.85 The relevant laws reflect this account: once their creation is
approved by City Council, BIDs operate largely independently, subject to having their budgets
approved. Their boards make decisions on what activities and actions the BID will undertake,
without review by city officials.
Evaluating BIDs: Relationship to city government, inclusivity, and representation
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BIDs have been described as “institutions that manage or govern common urban resources.”86
Their role is critical to understanding how they fit within the meaning of the urban commons.
This section expands upon existing scholarship, focusing on the effects of BIDs in Toronto and
elsewhere. Specifically, it explores three elements: the relationship of BIDs to city government,
who they represent, and how they are accountable.
Relationship to city government
BIDs exacerbate the tension in the line between ‘public’ or ‘private’ governance. They are not
simply private actors seeking additional power and do not fit easily within particular descriptions
as exclusionary or inequality-enhancing:87 they are complex organizations that defy easy
categorization.88 For example, some studies have found that BID administrators do not consider
the organizations governmental institutions, but rather part of the private sector.89 Wolf argued
that BIDs are “a part of urban governance and public administration,”90 and that BIDs must be
placed within the public administration context, even if their objectives focus on the ‘private’
concerns of their members. Richard Briffault noted that the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres are
interconnected as a result of the taxation model that creates BID funding: “BIDs are created by
public governments in a process in which their boundaries, programs, finances and governance
structures are shaped by government decisions.”91 Some scholars have concluded that BIDs are a
form of neoliberal management meant to compensate for declining public resources in
increasingly privatized economies with an ethos of low taxation in an era of “if you want it,
you’re going to have to fund it yourself.”92
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In practice, BIDs and local governments can have a highly cooperative relationship, operating
almost like a public–private partnership; in other contexts, the BID may function exclusively as a
private sector initiative. Most BIDs provide services and programs that would ordinarily be the
responsibility of municipal governments, like security, sanitation, physical improvements,
beautification, social services, and business-oriented programs.93 Some BIDs also play a
substantially more proactive role in local governance and administration by establishing policy
partnerships with local governments.94 Nathaniel Lewis found that as BIDs become service
providers, development brokers and place makers, there is a corresponding retreat of municipal
government.95 In Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, BIDs commonly offer consumer
marketing, often through community events. Functions may also differ based on size: a study of
BIDs in New York found that smaller organizations focus on physical maintenance, mid-sized
BIDs focus on marketing and promotional activities, and large BIDs take care of a massive range
of activities, including capital improvements.96
Hamill noted that the privileged status of local business improvement bodies ultimately implies
greater property rights, because such bodies are given the opportunity to lobby governments for
modifications to adjacent common property in a way that no other private property holder is
entitled to do.97 In this way, BIDs may also serve as lobby organizations for business interests,
which have enhanced access to the city government. However, Foster and Iaione argued that
BIDs are examples of the urban commons in that they allow a collection of public and private
actors to manage public resources within a nested governance structure.98 For example, one of
the largest BIDs in Toronto is the Toronto Entertainment BID. It was created in 2008 and
straddles two electoral districts due to its large size (156 city blocks). It represents more than
93
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1800 businesses and its 2016 budget was more than two million dollars (CAD). In 2013, it
funded a Master Plan drafted by consultants, setting out in more than 100 pages the BID’s
proposals for the public realm, focusing on details such as streetscaping, planters, cycling lanes
and other matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto.99 With regard to any city
proposals relating to the BID area, the Master Plan outlines in what circumstances the BID
should provide “official written endorsements,” only where “the BID is assured that the spirit
and intent of the Master Plan are respected.” It proposes a set process for councillor and staff
review of the Master Plan in connection with proposed developments. The Master Plan further
states that, “Where proposals are deemed to be fundamentally at odds with the spirit and intent of
the Master Plan, the BID reserves its right to voice its opposition to the application to the City
and/or Ontario Municipal Board.”100
Previous research on BIDs in Toronto has revealed the difficulty in categorizing them. In his
study of the development of the “creative city” within the Entertainment BID, Sébastien Darchen
found that the BID had a strong voice in community deliberations and that its interests were
specific to advantages for the member businesses.101 While council ultimately supported a
mixed-use neighbourhood with a more diverse range of economic activities than those proposed
by the BID, Darchen concluded that the promotion of arts and culture as imagined by the BID
led to revitalization of the area.102 Another study of BIDs revealed that BIDs shape boundaries,
market neighbourhoods, and affect governance overall.103
The privileged role of BIDs in urban governance increases over time. A comprehensive study of
BIDs in Center City, Pennsylvania evaluated the role of BIDs in urban governance. It revealed
99
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that BID directors play a profoundly important role in urban governance, and that their
involvement in the city’s governance became “deeper and wider” over the years. In particular,
BID directors began to advocate on positions that went beyond the BID to citywide matters such
as land-use planning, zoning, and intergovernmental funding for infrastructure repair.104 This
kind of organizational longevity appears to apply to Toronto as well: a study of Toronto’s
Downtown Yonge BID revealed that its objectives tended to evolve from basic operational and
tactical tasks to more strategic tasks.105
Representation
Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan argued that BIDs fundamentally increase space-related
tensions.106 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and ethnically mixed
neighbourhoods, where they can have the same kinds of impacts as in communities being subject
to gentrification. Schaller and Modan noted that, “In such neighborhoods, it is very often the case
that the constituents who are marginalized from the public decision-making process are the same
people who are most vulnerable to changes in the housing market. As rents and property taxes
increase, the residents who were ostensibly to benefit from such innovations may be displaced
from the neighborhood, and the democratic spaces of interaction where social networks are
created and maintained may disappear.”107 Another study found that BIDs insulate development
decisions from communities and neighbourhoods.108 It also found that BIDs do not engage in
neighbourhood advocacy or government–business relations, but instead focus on entertainment
and high-rent housing, with minimal attention to the interests of existing residents, with
“profound implications for notions of spatial and social justice.”109
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Legal and anecdotal evidence suggests that BIDs make decisions that expressly undermine
inclusivity.110 A poignant example is Los Angeles, where four separate cases have been brought
against the City and its BIDs for confiscating the property of homeless people, despite clear
jurisprudence preventing this.111 These unlawful seizures appeared to be random occurrences
while homeless people were at missions and downtown shelters getting food and services, with
items like tents, bedding, identification, and medications being seized.112 A permanent injunction
has been ordered against the City of Los Angeles, enjoining it not to confiscate and destroy
personal property that does not appear abandoned without notice.113 The plaintiffs allege that the
City of Los Angeles “acts in concert with the BID to identify property to be removed and to
ensure that the removals were not stopped or hindered.”114 In 2015, Toronto’s Chinatown BID
objected to a plan to introduce a youth homeless shelter within the boundaries of the BID.115 The
BID noted a lack of consultation on the proposal and possible negative effects on the area,
stating: “the BID had worked hard for a decade to “clean up” the area, and business owners are
worried the facility will turn Spadina into a “centre of homelessness.”116 The protest culminated
in placards within member businesses, as well as a demonstration at City Hall.117
Representation is a major element of these space-based tensions, specifically in relation to the
composition and mandates of BID boards. At present, residents have few, if any, representative
votes on BID boards.118 The board composition concentrates power among property and business
owners, restricting the scope of representation.119 This framework reinforces political dynamics
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that exclude marginalized and low-income residents, as well as small businesses. 120 Some
scholars have advocated for changing the composition of BID boards. For example, Schaller and
Modan noted that individual claims over neighbourhood space are greatly influenced by
immigration status, property ownership, class, and duration of residency in the community, and
argued that city officials should ensure that any BID includes community members.121 They
argued that including neighbourhood residents would ultimately not lead to a shift in power away
from businesses and property owners, because the other BID members would ultimately carry
the most power.
Accountability
In this context, accountability refers to the degree to which BIDs operate with openness and
fairness, and especially the degree to which they are subject to the same transparency and
accountability requirements as other public bodies.122 Briffault noted that BIDs are
“autonomous, even though subjected to municipal oversight in theory.”123 He defined
accountability in terms of reporting requirements to public officials, making a BID accountable
to its board, the business community that it represents, city council, and the public.124 City
governments may implement measures such as annual reports, outside audits, and sunset and
reauthorization requirements. The rationale for these mechanisms is to ensure continuous
evaluation of BID performance and to give power to municipal governments if BIDs are
overstepping their authorities, although others argue that they are pro forma and after the fact.125
In a popular newspaper, Ian Cook stated that BIDs may claim accountability to the public
through their links to city council, but “ultimately BIDs are not really accountable to the public
in general and are more focused on being accountable – of sorts – to businesses.”126
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Some scholars have argued that the design of BIDs limits the degree to which they can ever be
accountable. According to Wayne Batchis, Supreme Court jurisprudence has constitutionally
permitted municipal fragmentation, inequality, and privatization in the United States, all of
which made BIDs an essential tool for urban success.127 This ‘success’ ultimately allows BIDs to
achieve their goals by eliminating the “messiness” of democracy,128 and the price of this process
is to allow what has been conceived as “public” to become incrementally more “private.”129 One
example is the accountability of BIDs in relation to public safety.130 A study of street vendors in
New York revealed the extent to which BIDs use strategies such as public realm design (e.g.,
planters), collaboration with police, surveillance techniques, and even harassment to limit street
vending (which is largely illegal) within their boundaries.131 These techniques are highly
successful, and the landscape of street vending reflects the “decentralized, privatized and
informalized vending management” of BIDs, rather than formal laws.132
The City of Toronto manages accountability issues through various laws and policies, principally
the Code of Conduct for Members of Local Boards, which sets out the requirements of BIDs and
other local boards in the city.133 They specify that members may not accept a fee, advance, gift or
personal benefit that is connected directly or indirectly with the performance of his or her duties
of office; may not disclose confidential information unless required by law; may not use City or
BID land, facilities, equipment, supplies, services, staff or other resources for activities other
than the business of the local board or the City; must improperly use their influence; and must
not lobby public office holders without following the Lobbyist Code of Conduct. If BID board
members are found to have breached the Code of Conduct for Members of Local Boards, the
city’s Integrity Commissioner may also recommend that Council or the BID may remove
members of BID board members, among other sanctions.134 Thus, accountability requirements
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may effectively regulate BIDs as organizations, yet fail to capture the broader community effects
of BID actions.
This brief review of relevant literature related to governance shows that, in their existing design,
BIDs have significant decision-making power in local geographies of the city and represent BID
members rather than the broader local public. Accountability provisions may not safeguard the
effects of BID activities on the public, particularly the most vulnerable. BIDs may be viewed in
two different ways: as an independent organization or as a formal actor in local governance.
What if BIDs could be conceptualized as one part of a broader commons?
BIDs and the urban commons framework
The legal and social problems identified in BID governance – representation, accountability, and
an uncertain relationship with city governments – reflect the challenges of BIDs within a broader
system of local governance. Ultimately, the interests of BIDs reflect those of a privileged subset
that has considerable power in local governance without democratic legitimacy or strenuous
accountability. Any discussion of the urban commons should include issues related to power: a
devolution of responsibility and power to organizations like BIDs may ultimately exacerbate the
very sense of belonging that advocates of the urban commons seek to foster. According to
Ostrom, the urban commons is a matter of collaborative governance. However, urban
governance arrangements are generally voluntary and bind only those actually involved in the
governance scheme. Such arrangements can have effects for many, beyond the actors that are
specifically involved: “[I]n the case of urban commons governance institutions the governance
arrangement may affect the everyday life of all city inhabitants that fall within the boundaries of
the governance scheme (think of the BIDs, the decisions of which can have an impact also on
those who are not part of the BID governance).”135 Foster and Iaione acknowledged that the
bodies that are sharing governance authority may further inequality amongst residents.136 They
stressed the need for questions of accountability and legitimacy to be “raised and constantly
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invoked” when querying collaborate governance in the urban commons.”137 As Parker and
Schmidt wrote, “The urban commons perspective may also underplay the role of government in
deliberately creating shared urban resources and in selecting and enabling particular groups.”138
BIDs deserve particular scrutiny in terms of their role within the urban commons framework. On
one hand, they are woven into city administration through the existence of a dedicated office, an
approved budget, and accessible information on how they may be contacted. This suggests that
they are like any other local board of the City, with the responsibility to deliver a set of services
and accountability with regard to how they use their funds. On the other hand, in local planning
and other debates, they act as a privileged interest group to be consulted. This dual role creates
confusion as to what role they serve (local boards or interest groups?) and to whom they are
accountable (to the public or their members?). This confusion and narrow set of interests
ultimately undermine the urban commons by depleting the ‘common pool interest’ – the
democratic legitimacy of the local area.
The debates about the urban commons explored above – the site of the commons as the city as a
whole or a smaller geographic area; whether the resource is owned or not; and how decisionmaking is mediated – illustrate the uneasy nesting of BIDs as an example of the urban commons.
The ‘common pool resource’ engaged in BIDs is the spatial area defined by city bylaws.
However, the spaces are not simply those that belong to business and property owners, but
include ‘public’ areas like sidewalks and street furniture, and may include residential areas above
or adjacent to storefronts.139 Thus, the resource interest is shared among a diverse set of property
holders: BID members, but also a broader range of residents and the public. Non-property
owners have a stake in the area in question, however, these broader interests are not reflected in
the BID governance model.140 Moreover, this ‘common pool resource’ is also subject to many
city policies and bylaws, with numerous other parties asserting interest in the same spaces,
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including elected officials and organizations such as neighbourhood associations.141 In many
sites, there is no evidence that ‘regulatory slippage’ has occurred in BID areas such that the
common resource has degraded based on measures like quality of life. Indeed, BID areas in
Toronto are generally located in the most affluent areas of the city. Rather than municipal
institutions and land use regulations seeking to balance the competing interests of those in the
area, it may well be that the BID is focusing on augmenting a single slippage: the profitability of
member businesses. 142
Conceptualizing BIDs as an example of an urban commons has significant limitations. The
‘regulatory slipping’ in question is not necessarily the degradation of the resource (for example,
the city street) as identified by Hardin, where the resource becomes prone to destruction. Instead,
the regulatory slippage is reflected in the erosion of openness and participation in city-making,
caused by a focus on narrow interests to the detriment of a broader population.143 American
scholar Richard Schragger challenged local decision-making on the basis that it may have
negative implications for historically disenfranchised groups.144 He demonstrated that local
institutions can easily become instruments for the private management of civic life, captured by
powerful interest groups enforcing “a particular conception of public life to the exclusion of
other competing conceptions.”145
I suggest that BIDs should not be conceptualized as an example of the urban commons. Doing so
undermines the strength and importance of the ‘urban commons’ as a conceptual and legal tool
in reimagining city governance. The common pool resource – city spaces – must be governed by
a broader range of interests. The BID should be one of many actors with a stake in what Foster
and Iaione called “a visible, equal, contestable, and legitimate manner.”146 Scholars have
proposed various ways of encouraging involvement, including charrettes,147 opportunities for
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deliberative participation,148 and community-level institutions grounded in group-based
“differentiated solidarity.”149 I agree with Foster and Iaione’s statement that “thinking of the city
as an institution that promotes collaboration all the way across and down as a way to ‘share’ the
resources it controls can spur a host of innovative and progressive policies that address the social
and economic inequality that is becoming a feature of 21st century urbanization.”150
Understanding the BID as one player among many in urban governance reframes the BID as
only one of many interests, with an urgent call for a more thoughtful, inclusive, and
representative local governance model. City governments, and especially councillors, must
acknowledge the narrow interests that BIDs represent by reducing the extent to which they can
exert decision-making power. This would help achieve Gerald Frug’s vision for a healthy
community, “transformed from a concrete source of normative regulation to a loose
confederation joined by common symbols, sights, and spaces, an artifact of subjective
identification rather than tightly bounded common experiences.”151
Conclusion
The urban commons is not merely about rights and who has what interest in the standard
‘bundle’ language that property law asserts. In a city, it is also about a meaningful governance
model that permits residents, businesses’ and other key stakeholders to have a say and a role over
what happens in local spaces. This conception of the urban commons causes conflict when
considered in relation to BIDs, which have a conflicting identity as both an independent
organization and as part of the city’s governance framework. This paper advances that, instead of
framing BIDs as an example of the urban commons, scholars may adopt a broader, messier
notion of local governance that incorporates multiple voices, including BIDs, in a visible, equal,
and legitimate manner.
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